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Satellite constellations present unique capabilities and opportunities to Earth orbiting 
and near-Earth scientific and communications missions, but also present new challenges to 
cost estimators. An effective and adaptive cost model is essential to successful mission design 
and implementation, and as Distributed Spacecraft Missions (DSM) become more common, 
cost estimating tools must become more representative of these types of designs. Existing 
cost models often focus on a single spacecraft and require extensive design knowledge to 
produce high fidelity estimates. Previous research has examined the limitations of existing 
cost practices as they pertain to the early stages of mission formulation, for both individual 
satellites and small satellite constellations. Recommendations have been made for how to 
improve the cost models for individual satellites one-at-a-time, but much of the complexity in 
constellation and DSM cost modeling arises from constellation systems level considerations 
that have not yet been examined. This paper constitutes a survey of the current state-of-the-
art in cost estimating techniques with recommendations for improvements to increase the 
fidelity of future constellation cost estimates. To enable our investigation, we have developed 
a cost estimating tool for constellation missions. The development of this tool has revealed 
three high-priority shortcomings within existing parametric cost estimating capabilities as 
they pertain to DSM architectures: design iteration, integration and test, and mission 
operations. Within this paper we offer illustrative examples of these discrepancies and make 
preliminary recommendations for addressing them. DSM and satellite constellation missions 
are shifting the paradigm of space-based remote sensing, showing promise in the realms of  
Earth science, planetary observation, and various heliophysical applications. To fully reap 
the benefits of DSM technology, accurate and relevant cost estimating capabilities must 
exist; this paper offers insights critical to the future development and implementation of 
DSM cost estimating tools. 
Nomenclature 
n  = Number of identical spacecraft within a DSM architecture  
Cspacecraft = Cost of the spacecraft bus (FY00$K) 
Cpayload = Cost of the satellite payload (FY00$K) 
mdry = Dry mass of the satellite (kg) 
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RCconstellation =  Recurring cost of each of the satellites within the constellation 
RCindividual =  Recurring cost of an individual satellite  
b =  Learning curve factor 
 
CER = Cost Estimating Relationship 
DSM =  Distributed Spacecraft Mission 
ESTO = Earth Science Technology Office 
GAO = Government Accountability Office 
IA&T = Integration, Assembly, and Test  
MMS = Magnetospheric Multiscale Mission 
NASA = National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
RDTE = Research, design, test, and evaluation 
ST5 = Space Technology 5 Mission 
TAT-C = Tradespace Analysis Tool for Constellations 
TRL = Technological Readiness Level 
WBS = Work Breakdown Structure 
I. Introduction 
ATELLITE constellations present unique capabilities and opportunities to earth observing and communications 
missions, but also present new challenges to cost estimators. These new capabilities include increased science 
data volume, increased revisit frequency, multi-angle sensing capabilities, scalability, and decreased mission cost, 
among others.1 Satellite constellations and distributed spacecraft mission (DSM) architectures enable the mission 
architect to deploy several satellites in support of a common goal (or goals) and thereby offer opportunities for 
multiplatform data gathering and analysis that have not been available using previous technology. For example, the 
value of NASA’s Landsat Program is grounded in the wide range of data available to analysts and policy makers, 
enabled by the use of multiple satellites deployed over the span of nearly half a century. Each element of the Landsat 
Program has contributed incrementally to the collection of Earth satellite imagery and has consequently added to the 
value of the existing dataset. The Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment (GRACE) utilized two identical 
spacecraft to measure variations in the Earth’s gravity field and highlighted the value of multiple satellites working 
in support of a common mission objective.2 
Despite past success and recent enthusiasm, the field of Earth Science has been slow to adopt DSM architectures 
and has instead continued to utilize traditional, monolithic satellite designs, unless the mission objective specifically 
requires the use of multiple observatories. The initial hesitancy to adopt DSMs for Earth science applications may be 
rooted in the perception that constellation missions are either technologically or economically prohibitive. These 
concerns regarding DSMs are not limited to the Earth science community. A 2014 report by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) addressed the need for additional knowledge before decisions regarding the US Air 
Force proposal to pursue satellite disaggregation, the process of decomposing large, highly complex satellites (or 
constellations) into smaller, less individually complex ‘systems of systems’ could be finalized. The GAO cited 
uncertainty regarding both the magnitude of the benefits and the severity of risks as potential barriers to widespread 
use of disaggregated space systems, as well as the short term costs that might be associated with the cultural 
transition to disaggregated mission implementation.3 However, recent developments in small satellite technology 
and intersatellite communication links have made DSM architectures more feasible than ever before, and Earth 
science programs are uniquely poised to take advantage of these technologies. Cubesatellite and small satellite (mass 
<100kg) constellation missions, which fall within NASA’s Class D mission category, can accept more risk than 
missions with higher classifications, and are more likely to demonstrate or contribute to technologies that will be 
flown in the future. Small satellite DSMs can not only pave the way for larger programs, but they can also provide 
valuable data to the Earth science community in the process. 
DSM architectures are emerging as essential tools for the future of Earth observation. The NASA Earth Science 
Technology Office (ESTO) specifically included satellite constellation and formation flying missions in its 2030 
Science Vision as technologies that can enable the next generation of Earth science.4 The first competitively-
selected, space-based Earth Venture Mission proposal chosen for development by NASA under the Earth System 
Science Pathfinder (ESSP) program was awarded in 2012 to a constellation of eight microsatellites, the Cyclone 
Global Navigation Satellite System (CYGNSS), and was praised as both a “scientific and programmatic advance for 
NASA’s Earth science and applications program.”5 
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Previous research has examined the limitations of existing cost practices as they pertain to the early stages of 
mission formulation, for both individual satellites and small satellite constellations.6,7 Among these limitations is a 
tendency to underestimate the cost growth of Earth and Space Science missions.8 An effective and adaptive cost 
model is essential to successful mission design and implementation, and as DSMs become more common, cost 
estimating tools must become more representative of these types of designs. This has the potential to not only enable 
individual mission success, but also to promote more widespread use of DSM architectures for Earth observation.  
 Commercial satellite communications companies have already begun incorporating DSM architectures into their 
business models to leverage economies of scale and learning curve benefits, and recent trends seem to suggest that 
the strategy has been successful thus far. Iridium Satellite Communications, founded in 2001, is scheduled to begin 
launching its Iridium Next constellation this year, and has already begun working on development plans for 
subsequent spacecraft. The company has argued that Thales Alenia Space, which was responsible for building 81 
Iridium Next satellites, has a competitive advantage in that it has already mass-produced Iridium satellites and could 
transform that advantage into substantial cost savings if manufacturing efforts on the next satellites can begin 
relatively soon.9 Similarly, OneWeb Satellites has begun development of a satellite constellation manufacturing 
facility in Florida that is expected to be the birth place of nearly 900 satellites between now and the constellation’s 
anticipated 2018 launch.9,10 
 Earth science research missions, in contrast to highly uniform and commercial communications systems, often 
employ new technologies, low flight heritage instrumentation, or large sensor suites, the complexity of which is 
magnified when incorporated within a distributed system. Consequently, DSM efforts in the realm of Earth 
observation to date have included relatively few spacecraft. The GRACE mission, as mentioned previously, 
consisted of only two spacecraft that were launched together in 2002,2 and the Magnetospheric Multiscale Mission 
(MMS), a set of four identical spacecraft designed to examine magnetic reconnection, launched in 2015.11 Recent 
awards and project proposals including CYGNSS and the Time-Resolved Observations of Precipitation structure 
and storm Intensity with a Constellation of Smallsats (TROPICS) mission, which consists of 12 identical 3U cube 
satellites,12 show that while DSMs with a greater number of spacecraft are being developed, they are often relying 
on smaller satellites, which also have particular costing challenges.13,14  
 Maximizing the benefits of DSM architectures and understanding their cost profiles will require a deeper 
understanding of the nuances associated with the DSM lifecycle. Early mission phases, including Phase A and Phase 
B design, may require adaptations of existing engineering processes or development of entirely new approaches to 
design, manufacturing, integration and test. Initial efforts to optimize constellation architectures with respect to 
performance, measured in terms of maximum revisit time or similar coverage metrics, have sought to address often 
competing DSM design objectives, such as minimizing cost while maximizing science data volume. These works 
have tended to result in a set of possible solutions rather than a single optimum design, and the tradeoff analysis 
methods necessary to select a design from the solution set has been a fruitful ground for research.15,16 Others have 
addressed later phases of mission development: Wertz and Larson have argued that traditional satellite 
manufacturing, integration, and test practices will needlessly increase the cost and schedule demands of 
constellation programs, and have called for greater incorporation of concurrent engineering practices and emphasis 
on high quality processes as a method of ensuring high quality products.17 Once constructed and fit for flight, the 
spacecraft must be launched in a manner that minimizes system cost without compromising safety. A 2008 seminar 
series conducted by Honeywell Technology Solutions, Inc. and NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) 
focused on the best practices of constellation operations, noting that significant events in past constellation programs 
have tended to shape the DSM development culture.18 For example, the deployment strategy may include several 
different configurations, placing spacecraft as either primary or secondary payloads, and launch providers, 
leveraging different launch services to achieve specific orbit configurations or to minimize the threat of launch 
failure to the lifetime of the DSM. If design flexibility is desirable, the constellation itself may be designed to 
include a number of options that can be chosen later in the constellation lifetime and implemented through a 
corresponding launch strategy.19 Operation of the spacecraft once in orbit follows a similar approach seeking to 
minimize cost without increasing the risk. This has manifested itself as the increased use of intersatellite links, 
automated ground station tasks, and changes to ground system resources, including personnel and anomaly 
identification and tracking systems. 
 Each of these challenges and mitigation strategies has an impact on overall mission cost, and there has been 
limited effort to identify the appropriate cost estimating approach for DSMs given these developments. Optimization 
efforts that have considered mission cost have typically employed cost estimating relationships (CERs) that were 
developed for monolithic spacecraft.15,16 This approach presents three obstacles to high fidelity constellation cost 
estimating. First, all CERs are developed based on historical data sets, and therefore, an underlying assumption is 
that historical trends will hold for the foreseeable future. The application of existing CERs to DSM architectures, 
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which often leverage advanced or specialized technology, may be inappropriate. Second, there has been a tendency 
in early optimization efforts to estimate the total mission cost for a DSM containing n identical spacecraft by 
calculating the cost of one spacecraft and then multiplying it n times. This method fails to account for benefits of 
developing multiple spacecraft simultaneously, such as economies of scale and learning curve advantages, and 
similarly fails to address the additional cost-risk associated with late design changes or manufacturing errors.20 The 
underlying assumptions regarding the design and manufacturing process may therefore be challenged by the 
emerging DSM paradigm. Third, the design process for DSMs may account for system scalability and flexibility in a 
way not addressed by monolithic design efforts. For example, as DSM mission owners leverage the distributed 
nature of the system, performance plateaus, and staged deployment strategies, the costs and value generated by the 
system must be taken into account through proper discounting and probabilistic cost estimating, given that the cost 
and value depends not only on the initial architecture, but also on later decisions to exercise (or not exercise) system 
options.19 
 Given the importance of accurate cost estimating to the success of mission proposals, and the ever increasing 
scrutiny of how scientific agencies spend taxpayer dollars, an accurate cost estimating approach for constellations is 
an essential development tool for DSMs. This paper discusses an attempt to apply the existing costing toolset to 
DSM architectures in the form of a preliminary, aggregated costing tool. This attempt, building upon the work 
presented by Nag et. al in their 2014 work,7 revealed three gaps within the existing cost estimating toolset; we argue 
that improvements to these areas could increase the accuracy of future constellation cost estimates. This paper 
addresses the outcome of the survey we conducted and gaps in the constellation cost estimating toolkit that we 
encountered while building our aggregated model. The model itself will be leveraged as part of a larger effort, being 
led by NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) to develop Tradespace Analysis Tool for Constellations (TAT-
C). We will present the specific details and results of the aggregated cost model in a later paper, once TAT-C has 
been released.  
 In the second section of this paper, we present necessary background for the fields of both DSM architectures 
and parametric cost estimating, and discuss previous work related to these research areas. In the third section, we 
outline our methodology and the development of the aggregate cost model. In the fourth section, we present our 
observations and recommendations regarding the future of DSM cost estimating efforts, based on our survey of the 
current cost tools available to DSM project managers and our work developing the aggregate cost model. In the fifth 
section, we outline a simple, illustrative example of the implementation of our first set of recommendations. Finally, 
we present our conclusions and plans for future work. 
II. Background  
This paper lies at the intersection of DSM optimization and cost estimation research, and as such some 
preliminary background is required on each subject. In this section, we offer a brief summary of distributed 
spacecraft mission terminology, common parametric cost estimating techniques for Earth orbiting spacecraft, and 
previous work that has examined the question of costing satellite constellations.  
A. Distributed Spacecraft Mission Terminology 
DSM architectures have traditionally been described in terms of four potential classifications,20 which primarily 
characterize the mission design process and deployment strategy.  
1) Constellations: Missions that are designed to utilize multiple spacecraft, placed in specific orbits and in 
support of a common goal from their inception. Constellation missions can be deployed altogether or in 
incremental sets. Classic examples of constellation missions include the Global Positioning System (GPS), 
NASA’s Tracking Data Relay Satellite system (TDRS),21 MMS, and CYGNSS. 
 
2) Formation Flying Missions: Formation flying missions require multiple spacecraft with specific spatial 
configuration requirements, such as relative distance or three dimensional spatial relationships, which are 
controlled through direct sensing capabilities of one spacecraft tracking at least one other spacecraft. Loose 
formation flying missions impose less stringent relative spatial requirements, while preserving the requirement 
that the spacecraft orientation be maintained relative to the other spacecraft within the formation. The GRACE 
mission leveraged this type of DSM architecture through the use of two identical spacecraft placed 
approximately 220 km apart.2  
 
3) Fractionated Spacecraft Missions: Fractionated spacecraft missions distribute the functional capabilities of a 
traditional, monolithic spacecraft across multiple spacecraft, which in turn can share their resources through 
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wireless networking. The US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) pursued this mission 
concept in its Future, Fast, Flexible, Fractionated Free-flying Spacecraft United by Information Exchange 
(System F6) program, but the project was cancelled in 2013.22 
 
4) Ad-Hoc Missions: Ad-hoc missions have so far been defined as those DSMs which are “generated as launch 
opportunities arise”23 or become “a DSM after the fact,”20 and therefore cubesatellite DSMs constructed through 
a series of secondary launch opportunities or individual missions that are combined to support common goals 
fall within this category. One such joint mission, the Ocean Topography Experiment (TOPEX/Poseidon) and 
subsequently Jason-1, not only illustrates the concept of an ad-hoc constellation, but also highlights the need for 
an additional, more nuanced sub-classification for ad-hoc DSM architectures, including the notion of purely ad 
hoc and temporally distributed spacecraft missions that we propose within this paper.  
 TOPEX was originally a NASA and JPL based experiment, while Poseidon was being developed by the 
French space agency, CNES, and both missions were focused on measuring ocean topography. The combined 
mission, TOPEX/Poseidon, was created by combining these two separate projects and launching a single, jointly 
developed spacecraft in 1992.24 The two agencies then shared the development and operation of a follow on 
mission known as Jason-1, which launched in 2001. Once Jason-1 was successfully inserted into its orbit, 
TOPEX/Poseidon and Jason-1 formed what we refer to within this paper as a purely ad-hoc DSM. The two 
spacecraft were designed separately (not developed concurrently), but the first mission, TOPEX/Poseidon, 
exerted design influence on Jason-1. Collectively, the two spacecraft supported a common mission objective.  
 The TOPEX/Poseidon mission officially ended in 2006, but additional follow on missions, the Ocean Surface 
Topography Mission (OSTM/Jason-2) and Jason-3, were launched in 2008 and 2016 respectively.24 These 
follow on missions are not only complete missions in and of themselves, but also contribute to a long-term, 
common mission objective, to study ocean surface topography. There is clearly significant value added to the 
science community by the creation of a multi-decadal record. The Landsat Missions have further demonstrated 
this fact through the generation of the longest duration, Earth imaging effort ever produced.25 Instances of 
extended duration missions that consist of many generations of spacecraft are common in both the science and 
commercial communications realms. We therefore propose the term temporally distributed spacecraft mission to 
address a series of missions that may or may not have overlapping operational lifetimes, and are designed over 
the course of many years to support a common, long duration mission objective or objectives. We believe these 
temporally distributed spacecraft missions should be of interest to the cost estimating community because there 
are likely to be design heritage and learning curve cost savings associated with follow on missions that may not 
be captured if the missions are considered fully separate entities and because of the distinct type of science added 
by long-term observations offered by type of architecture. Even if the type of data changes from mission to 
mission, the extended record and common mission objective, support the notion of follow-on missions as 
temporally distributed spacecraft missions. The flexible, staged-deployment mission we described previously can 
be included within this category as well, particularly if later sets of satellites are designed in response to 
increased demand on the system or a need for supplemental data or coverage. 
 The Afternoon Train (A-Train) represents both a purely ad-hoc and temporally distributed spacecraft mission 
architecture. In the early 2000s, four spacecraft were launched into highly similar orbits, somewhat by 
accident.26 Similar Earth science missions had requested nearly identical orbits behind Aqua, which launched in 
2002. Aura and PARASOL followed in 2004, and CloudSat and CALIPSO were placed in the train in 2006.27 
Aqua, Aura, CloudSat and CALIPSO created a purely ad hoc constellation; the satellites were leveraged by the 
Earth science community as a system supporting shared mission goals, and the data gathered from each 
spacecraft helped to shed light on the data gathered by the others. Follow on missions, PARASOL, GCOM-W1, 
and OCO-2, contributed to the formation of a temporally distributed spacecraft mission. (The Glory satellite 
mission was also designed to supplement the A-Train as part of a temporally distributed spacecraft mission, but 
failed to reach its intended orbit.) The additional missions were added to the A-Train to enhance the data being 
recorded by the original satellites, and to continue the data gathering effort as the original missions approach 
their conclusion. The common objective has been furthered despite the decommissioning of PARASOL, which 
was lowered out of configuration in 2013. The early success of the original purely ad-hoc A-Train DSM was 
likely a contributing factor to the increased interest and acceptance of DSM architectures for Earth observation, 
as it highlighted the value of varied science instruments taking near-simultaneous measurements to scientists 
examining global climate change. Then, through the use of a temporally distributed spacecraft mission 
architecture, scientists have been able to continue to offer scientific insights that would not have been possible 
with individual missions. 
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Within these categories, DSMs can be thought of as homogenous, if all of the member satellites are identical, or 
heterogeneous, if the member satellites are different from one another. We refer the reader to the 2016 (anticipated) 
paper by Le Moigne et al. for a more detailed discussion of additional terminology and particular DSM orbital 
configurations.20 
B. Cost Estimation 
1. Parametric Cost Estimating  
Cost estimating and cost analyses are essential elements of space mission project management. The cost 
estimating process enables project managers to assess project feasibility, cost risk, and possible alternative designs, 
as necessary, and allows stakeholders (e.g. Congress, payload/instrument owners) to better understand mission 
requirements and project development. The NASA Cost Estimating Handbook outlines three cost estimation 
methodologies: analogy cost estimating, parametric cost estimating, and engineering build-up methodology (also 
known as “bottom-up” estimating).28 In this paper, we have focused exclusively on parametric cost estimating 
practices, and refer the reader to the NASA Cost Estimating Handbook for additional reading regarding the other 
methodologies. 
Parametric cost estimating relies on the use of historical data and regression analysis to create Cost Estimating 
Relationships (CERs) that are then used to develop cost estimates based on only key mission cost drivers, which can 
include diverse mission characteristics such as system mass, number of instruments, or management type (e.g. 
commercial, government, or military). The advantages of parametric costing practices, in comparison to other 
methodologies, include statistical validity, objectivity, consistency, and speed. The disadvantages of the parametric 
method include the time-intensive process of developing CERs and a ‘black-box’ tendency for inexperienced cost 
estimators to blindly input and output values without sufficient mission context, which can threaten the transparency 
and usefulness of the estimate. Furthermore, once a CER has been defined for a particular dataset, it reflects the 
nature of that set, and it must be assumed that historical trends will hold into the foreseeable future. Therefore, the 
CER cannot be reliably extended beyond the original parameters and application of a given CER to components of 
an innovative or paradigm-shifting mission may be inappropriate. Parametric cost estimating is the most appropriate 
method for early phase design estimates as it requires few detailed design decisions and allows for probabilistic 
estimating, which can be helpful in design tradeoff analyses and project planning.  
 
Table 1. Common parametric cost estimating models for spacecraft and space missions 
Name Developer Original Release Date 
Most Recent 
Release Date Scope Availability 
Unmanned 
Space Vehicle 
Cost Model 
(USCM)30 
Space and Missile 
Systems 
Organization 
(SAMSO), Cost 
Analysis Division 
1969 June 2015 
Unmanned, earth orbiting 
spacecraft; does not include 
launch vehicles 
Public 
Small Satellite 
Cost Model 
(SSCM)31 
Aerospace 
Corporation 1995 January 2015 
Earth orbiting or near planetary 
spacecraft with mass < 1000kg; 
dataset is restricted to post-1990 
missions  
Public 
NASA 
Instrument 
Cost Model 
(NICM)32 
NASA Cost Analysis 
Division and Jet 
Propulsion 
Laboratory 
2007 Spring 2014 
CERs for specific types of 
instruments; found to be low 
fidelity for Explorer-class 
missions* 
Access 
through 
NASA ONCE 
Portal 
NASA 
Instrument 
Cost Model for 
Explorer Class 
Missions  
(NICM-E)32 
NASA Cost Analysis 
Division and Jet 
Propulsion 
Laboratory 
Spring 2014 Spring 2014 
Instruments intended for flight on 
Class C missions, with substantial 
university or research foundation 
involvement, and significant 
design heritage 
Access 
through 
NASA ONCE 
Portal 
                                                            
* The NICM-E CER (subsequent row) was released as an addition to NICM VI to address the need for higher 
fidelity Explorer-class mission instrumentation 
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Mission 
Operations 
Cost Estimating 
Tool 
(MOCET)33 
Aerospace 
Corporation and 
NASA Science 
Office For Mission 
Assessments 
Released 
within 
ONCE 
Portal 
Released 
within 
ONCE Portal 
Phase E mission costs; planetary, 
Earth science, near Earth orbiting 
missions 
Access 
through 
NASA ONCE 
Portal 
NASA Air 
Force Cost 
Model 
(NAFCOM)34 
NASA Cost Analysis 
Division and 
Marshall Space 
Flight Center 
1990 
(Released as 
NASCOM 
hardcopy 
database) 
2012 (Final 
release; 
replaced by 
PCEC) 
Launch vehicles, Crew 
Exploration Vehicles, Landers, 
Rovers, other flight hardware 
elements 
No longer 
available; 
retired in 
2012 
Project Cost 
Estimating 
Capability 
(PCEC)34 
NASA Headquarters 
and Marshall Space 
Flight Center 
May 2014 August 2016 
All elements of the NASA Work 
Breakdown Structure as defined 
in NPD 7120.5E; carries forward 
select elements of NAFCOM 
Public 
Aerospace 
Picosatellite 
Cost Model  
(A-PICOMO)35 
Aerospace 
Corporation 
Model was 
never 
publicly 
released 
Model was 
never 
publicly 
released 
Satellites with mass much less 
than 50 kg, with an emphasis on 
mass less than 10kg; directly 
motivated by a lack of 
applicability of SSCM to 
cubesatellites 
Aerospace 
Corporation 
internal effort 
Constructive 
Systems 
Engineering 
Cost Model 
(COSYSMO)36 
Massachusetts 
Institute of 
Technology and 
University of 
Southern California 
2005 2009 
Systems engineering efforts for 
large scale systems (hardware and 
software) 
Public 
Technology 
Cost and 
Schedule 
Estimating 
(TCASE)28† 
NASA Headquarters 
and SpaceWorks 
Enterprises, Inc. 
Released 
within 
ONCE 
Portal 
Released 
within 
ONCE Portal 
Schedule duration and cost ranges 
for a new technology 
development project (TRL1 – 
TRL6) 
Access 
through 
NASA ONCE 
Portal 
 Existing parametric models for space mission cost estimation include a wide range of applications, systems, and 
objectives. Table 1 presents some widely accepted parametric cost estimating tools that have largely influenced 
space mission cost estimating in recent decades; we present these models to provide context for this paper, but make 
no claim to exhaustiveness in this list. Generally, cost estimating methodologies emerge in response to technological 
trends. The advent of small satellites in the mid 1980’s contributed to the development of the Small Satellite Cost 
Model, and as project intricacy has increased with greater technological capability in recent decades, efforts have 
been made to develop complexity based cost estimating relationships (CCERs), which enable mission stakeholders 
to consider schedule and cost as part of the design process, rather than designing a mission first, and assessing cost 
and schedule demands second.29 Despite the recent trend toward DSM architectures, a high fidelity DSM cost 
estimating tool does not yet exist.  
 
2. Work Breakdown Structure 
The Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) is used to provide a hierarchical representation of all deliverables 
required to meet the project objectives and is an integral part of the project cost management process.38 System 
requirements are used to develop a WBS that accounts for all of the work content to be contributed by all 
performing project stakeholders, and therefore work not accounted for within the WBS is not considered to be part 
of the project and is not accounted for in cost estimates.39 While greater levels of project detail are provided at 
deeper levels of the WBS, a standard template exists for Levels 1 and 2 of all NASA space flight and technology 
projects. The space flight project template, as presented in the NASA Work Breakdown Structure Handbook, is 
provided for reference in Figure 1, and descriptions of each of the Level 2 elements are available within the NASA 
Work Breakdown Structure Handbook, Appendix C.  
 
                                                            
† TCASE is an analogy and decision tree based model and was the second most downloaded model on the One 
NASA Cost Engineering (ONCE) portal in 2014 and 2015.37 Despite the fact that this is not a parametric approach, 
it is being included here for reference given its widespread use. 
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Figure 1. Space Flight Project Standard Level 2 Elements (NASA Work Breakdown Structure Handbook39) 
C. Previous Work 
Satellite constellation optimization, often subject to a cost objective or constraint, has been explored in previous 
work. Such optimization problems have been of particular interest, as design-to-cost mission development has 
become a standard method of managing tight program budgets, while seeking to minimize cost and maximize 
scientific return. Some previous optimization efforts have implemented cost modules as part of their system model, 
but these cost modules have been rooted in traditional CERs and costing best practices as presented by Wertz and 
Larson in their book on Space Mission Analysis and Design, rather than based in costing strategies that have been 
tailored for DSMs.15,16,17 In the most simplistic cases, the cost estimate is produced costing a single satellite and 
multiplying it n times to achieve the cost of the entire DSM, resulting in an estimate that fails to account for the 
nuances of DSM development and the cost savings that can be achieved by developing multiple spacecraft in 
parallel.20 Therefore, the use of traditional costing practices may threaten the validity of the optimization results. 
Nag et. al addressed the challenges of using traditional cost estimating processes for DSM architectures in their 2014 
work, specifically citing the low reliability of existing learning curve factors when applied to DSM member 
satellites, the lack of parametric cost tools intended for satellites with mass less than 20 kg, and insufficient 
understanding of small satellite DSM operations practices as a barrier to accurate costing.7  
The need for reliable cost estimating processes for DSM architectures, as highlighted by these previous efforts, is 
the motivation for this survey. In the following sections, we build upon the work presented by Nag et. al7 by 
identifying additional challenges to DSM cost estimating. We recognize that DSM architectures will inherently 
challenge traditional cost estimating assumptions and therefore make preliminary recommendations for improving 
future DSM cost estimation.  
III. Methodology  
To enable our investigation, we have developed a cost estimating tool for constellation missions. Our aggregate 
cost model combines widely accepted CERs from a variety of existing cost estimating tools into an automated 
costing tool capable of enabling relative cost trades for candidate architectures.40 The development of this aggregate 
model has allowed us to investigate the current state of the art in cost estimating technology and how those tools can 
be applied to DSM architectures. Ultimately, our aggregate cost estimating tool will be incorporated within the 
NASA GSFC Tradespace Analysis Tool for Constellations (TAT-C), which is currently undergoing development.41 
TAT-C will enable pre-Phase A DSM mission analysis with respect to user defined performance and cost 
requirements. Given the pre-Phase A nature of TAT-C, a high fidelity, exact-value cost estimate is not possible, as 
project scope creep, schedule delays, and other system level considerations cannot be sufficiently forecast or 
addressed. We have chosen not to address scheduling within our model and instead assume that the project is 
executed at the optimal pace, therefore incurring neither standing army nor rush development costs. Shao et al. took 
a similar approach in their 2014 work on performance based cost modeling for small satellites, but leveraged only a 
subset of the existing models we have incorporated into our tool.42 As stated previously, while we present a high 
level discussion of the cost model we have developed within this paper, we reserve a more thorough discussion of 
the tool and associated results for a later paper, once TAT-C has been released.  
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A preliminary, high-level representation of our aggregate cost model is presented in Figure 2. We have chosen to 
leverage existing models rather than developing CERs specifically for DSM or constellation architectures in part 
because the use of DSM architectures for Earth science missions is still relatively new, and as such the data set 
would be skewed significantly toward programs with low levels of experience and high implementation costs (e.g. 
new facilities, specific personnel needs, additional research and development efforts), and because cost data is often 
competition sensitive and therefore not publicly available at the level of detail that would be required to establish 
high fidelity CERs. Additionally, the existing toolset has the benefit of decades of use by the costing community. By 
leveraging this collective experience, we have attempted to identify and address existing gaps, rather than creating a 
new tool with a new set of limitations. We have limited ourselves to the use of publicly available CERs and cost 
estimating tools. 
The model accepts an input file of DSM characteristics, including a list of observatories‡, mission owner 
specifications, and ground stations. A contextual assessment of the DSM architecture is formulated according to the 
number and distribution of satellites within the architecture, as well as assessing the number of unique spacecraft 
within the architecture (and by extension the number of copies of a given satellite). This information, in conjunction 
with satellite mass, is used to select appropriate learning curve factors7,17 and spacecraft bus cost reliability factors.14 
The mission owner and satellite technology readiness level (TRL) are collectively used to select an appropriate 
scaling factor for research and development costs, as discussed by Wertz and Larson17. 
The spacecraft parameters (including system wet and dry mass, TRL, and payload type, among others) are then 
used to assess the spacecraft bus cost using CERs from either the Unmanned Space Vehicle Cost Model (USCM)30 
or the Small Satellite Cost Model (SSCM)31, depending on the appropriate mass classification. While not currently 
implemented, we are developing a method of addressing satellites at the lowest end of the mass spectrum (those less 
than 50 kg). Previous research has noted the inappropriateness of the SSCM for microsatellites and cubesatellites7,43, 
                                                            
‡ We use the term observatory here to refer to a complete satellite, including the instrument (payload) and supporting 
subsystems (spacecraft or spacecraft bus).  
 
Figure 2. High-level representation of aggregate cost model 
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and we plan to address this need within our model and in future work. The payload is then costed using CERs from 
the NASA Instrument Cost Model (NICM)32. 
Mission operations are calculated using a combination of the CERs for Earth science missions found within the 
Mission Operations Cost Estimation Tool (MOCET)33, USCM, and established best practices17. Wraps costs, 
including program management, systems engineering, integration and test, and satellite-side launch operations costs 
are calculated using CERs from USCM, SSCM and Larson and Wertz. Launch vehicle costs are calculated 
according to available pricing information from a range of commercial and government launch services providers. 
The final step of the cost estimating process accounts for cost risk and records relevant assumptions. A common 
threat to the usefulness of automated cost estimating tools is their ‘black box’ nature, which can obscure important 
caveats to the estimation. At all decision points within our tool, relevant information regarding the nature of the 
decision is recorded and output as part of the final cost documentation. The output includes these caveats and a 
probabilistic distribution of the cost estimate for the mission lifecycle, as well as recurring and nonrecurring cost for 
each of the space flight project standard WBS Level 2 elements. 
IV. Results and Recommendations 
Building the aggregate cost model required us to examine each step of the DSM development process and 
compare the available cost assessment tools to current trends in DSM development. Below, we present a summary 
of our observations and ways in which the existing parametric cost estimating toolkit may not reflect the emerging 
DSM paradigm, and therefore may not be reliable for DSM cost estimation. Given that cost is often incurred in an 
attempt to mitigate risk, we found that many of the areas in which DSM architectures are presenting new risks, or 
mitigating risks in new ways, are the same areas in which DSM costs most notably deviate from previous cost 
estimating capabilities: design iteration, systems integration and testing, and mission operations. Technology 
development during mission development presents additional challenges for small satellite DSMs.  
 
1. Design Iteration 
Iteration is a common process within systems engineering, and many iterations of a single design may be 
required before multidisciplinary, and often competing, objectives can be satisfied. Given that the optimization 
process for DSM architectures is subject to additional requirements (as compared to a single observatory) and is 
likely to result in a set of optimal solutions rather than a single optimum16, architecture trade studies can help to 
avoid costly rework after the design has been finalized and the manufacturing process has begun. Design iteration 
should therefore be considered an essential deliverable within the development process and accounted for as a 
systems engineering cost.  
However, the WBS Handbook does not address the need for system rework (which includes design iteration), 
but instead states that “Rework, Retesting and Refurbishing are additional non-product oriented terms and are not 
usually recommended as appropriate” for inclusion within the WBS.39 We argue that because DSM architectures are 
not the ‘usual’ case, design iteration would be an appropriate element of the Element 6 Spacecraft WBS hierarchy. 
We further extend this argument to rework, retesting, and refurbishment. While rework for a single satellite is 
limited to a single flight system, constellation mission rework can involve changes to a greater number of 
instruments and the costs of rework scale accordingly. This cost escalates as the satellite moves through the design 
process; the cost of correcting a design flaw or implementation error increases by approximately an order of 
magnitude for each phase of the development cycle.17 Therefore, available cost margins may not fully allow for the 
possibility of significant design changes to multiple spacecraft and provide insufficient protection from cost 
overruns. Given that cost overruns are of particular concern for Earth science missions8, this could be especially 
beneficial to Earth science project managers. 
The MMS mission encountered problems with the Fast Plasma Instrument (FPI) that underscore the need for 
specific rework allowances. During the integration phase, optocouplers within FPI were found to be unsuitable for 
the original mission requirements. Because each of the four spacecraft included the FPI instrument suite, a total of 
288 optocouplers were required, and their failure to meet mission requirements presented a serious threat to the 
mission’s science return. The resulting rework caused significant cost overruns, and before the completion of the 
integration and test phase, MMS had used almost all of its available budget.44 As of the 2014 GAO project update on 
MMS, NASA GSFC (the MMS project office) had committed $2.15 million to correct problems associated with the 
optocouplers. The resulting schedule delays also contributed to significant cost growth. Once the MMS optocoupler 
rework was complete, the NASA GSFC thermal vacuum chamber was needed for testing of the James Webb Space 
Telescope (JWST), which was given testing priority. The testing delay, and other delays associated with the 2013 
government shutdown, resulted in a launch delay from October 2014 to March 2015 and additional cost growth. 
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Ultimately, MMS experienced approximately 3% development cost growth,§ relative to the 2009 baseline 
development cost ($857 million) approved by NASA, resulting in a final development cost of approximately $877 
million and a lifecycle cost of $1.083 billion.46,47  
We recommend that design iteration, which has the potential to result in design rework, retesting, and 
refurbishment, be specifically included within WBS Element 6 for constellation missions as an essential 
spacecraft deliverable required to achieve project objectives. While this recommendation does not pertain 
specifically to parametric cost estimating methodologies, it addresses an opportunity for program managers and cost 
estimators to develop cost management practices that more completely reflect the current state of DSM development 
practices.  
Multiplicative factors are often applied to scale research, development, test and evaluation (RDTE) costs up or 
down depending on the extent of development heritage associated with a satellite design and the amount of design 
iteration that may be necessary to leverage prior work. Within our aggregate cost model, we have applied these 
factors to scale back RDTE costs for copies of a satellite within a constellation architecture. Satellites with a higher 
payload TRL level but common bus design can similarly be scaled up. Satellites within purely ad-hoc and 
temporally distributed space missions present an opportunity for developers to leverage prior knowledge and 
existing on-orbit assets to inform the nature of their design, which will result in specific design requirements that 
warrant consideration as iterations on a previous effort. For temporally distributed spacecraft missions, the ability to 
update system functionality by adding technologies intended to target system weaknesses may offer science benefits 
but require highly specialized design, and therefore traditional heritage factors may not remain relevant.  
We intend to examine the applicability of existing design heritage factors to Earth science constellations 
and ad-hoc DSMs in a future work. 
 
2. Systems Integration and Testing 
Satellite integration typically consists of mating the spacecraft bus and payload and then testing the system as a 
complete unit, but unique constellation technologies are changing the procedures required to ensure functionality on 
orbit and presenting opportunities to reduce costs. For example, each member of a Class D small satellite 
constellation may undergo less extensive testing than a similar individual spacecraft might, in order to reserve test 
funding for constellation-level test efforts. In short, system integration accounts for the integration of each individual 
observatory and the constellation fleet as a whole and funding must be carefully split among these efforts. 
Furthermore, many constellation integration and test practices have been developed specifically for DSMs, and the 
data sets behind existing parametric tools are primarily comprised of monolithic spacecraft. Previously existing 
CERs may not accurately capture the integration and tests costs of DSM architectures, exemplifying the concern 
presented previously regarding the applicability of parametric cost estimating methodologies to innovative 
technologies.  
Satellite manufacturing is a precise, highly specialized procedure. To reduce manufacturing costs, experts have 
recommended that program managers incorporate manufacturing feasibility as a system design requirement and rely 
more heavily on concurrent engineering practices.17 This could increase spacecraft design costs, in terms of schedule 
and personnel requirements, but reduce manufacturing costs. Careful procedure planning and maintenance could 
further streamline the manufacturing process and eliminate excessive overhead. However, investments in 
manufacturing must account for the number of copy satellites to be produced and/or the amount of design heritage 
from one DSM project to the next. A commercial company constructing hundreds of satellites has much more to 
gain from low manufacturing costs than experimental science mission developers, such as NASA GSFC or the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). Developers of scientific constellation programs may benefit less from developing an 
assembly line in the traditional sense, in which the product moves down the line of processes, and more from 
developing an assembly line in which the process and manufacturing personnel move from product to product. This 
moveable-process assembly line approach requires highly specialized teams with interdisciplinary skills, which may 
incur atypical costs. For small satellites in particular, this may enable the detailed manufacturing processes that 
accompany miniaturized technologies to be performed with greater reliability than in a traditional manufacturing 
environment. The cost management result of this manufacturing process is that spacecraft manufacturing is a project 
deliverable more appropriately categorized under WBS Element 10, Systems Integration and Testing, than it is as an 
element unique to the individual spacecraft, as it is under WBS Element 6.  
                                                            
§For additional information pertaining to MMS cost and schedule overruns, we refer the reader to 2009 National 
Academies publication, “A Performance Assessment of NASA's Heliophysics Program” Chapter 2, Section 2.2.45  
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We recommend manufacturing be considered as an element of systems integration and testing (WBS10) 
for constellation missions and encourage cost estimating model developers to develop CERs that address the 
unique nature of satellite constellation manufacturing and integration. 
Wertz and Larson have argued that the constellation testing phase has the greatest cost and schedule saving 
improvements, not only because testing multiple copies of identical systems can be seen as redundant, but also 
because early design flaw detection prevents the need for extensive rework.17 They have encouraged constellation 
mission developers to design for accessibility at later stages to enable lower cost defect correction without 
compromising mission objectives. MMS is again a suitable example of how these practices might have been 
implemented to save costs. Substantial changes to the mission, including the management of the satellites’ power 
budgets, were made to accommodate the optocouplers, even after the failed components had been replaced with new 
ones.46 Early testing and design accessibility could have allowed for alternate repair or design rework that may have 
limited the mission profile changes or cost overruns. Earth science program managers are increasingly considering 
accessibility as a method for mitigating the possibility of late changes in both large and small spacecraft. For larger 
satellites, integration and test may also include the verification of intersatellite link technologies and require the 
testing of spatial orientation sensors. These new procedures may also require additional testing equipment or 
facilities, which could significantly raise the cost of testing.  
Constellations offer a unique opportunity for program managers to distinguish between reliable and redundant 
satellites. A satellite that can tolerate a subsystem failure is reliable, while a satellite that is a non-essential, exact 
replica of another member satellite within the constellation is redundant. If a constellation is capable of meeting 
mission objectives after the loss of a member satellite, the constellation itself is fault tolerant even if the member 
satellites are not. Designers can therefore accept greater risk at the subsystem and satellite level, as long as the 
constellation architecture can tolerate the decreased functionality or loss of a member satellite. Designing this fault 
tolerance requires consideration of constellation performance plateaus, which are commonly considered when 
designing deployment or degradation plans. The ability to reconfigure constellations on-orbit can also increase the 
system robustness.17 This system-level fault tolerance may result in less stringent testing requirements for individual 
member satellites and significant cost savings.  
We recommend that program managers and cost estimators consider the nuances of constellation fault 
tolerance and system testing when allocating project funding and considering the tradeoffs between 
individual satellite and DSM risk. The cost implications of constellation performance plateaus warrant further 
research and should be examined carefully by cost estimators working on projects that are tolerant to the loss of one 
or more observatories. 
 
3. Mission Operations 
Satellite constellations and DSMs operations can be simplified by operating a fleet of observatories as a single 
unit or through the increased use of automated operations practices. The ability to manage an entire fleet of satellites 
simultaneously offers significant cost and risk savings with respect to orbit maintenance and communications.48 
Autonomous system operation reduces the need for some ground station equipment, facilities, and personnel, but 
also results in increased software development and testing costs and software specific risks, which have been shown 
to contribute to accidents in unique ways within autonomous aerospace systems.49 DSM operations therefore present 
new tradeoffs between cost and risk.  
The cost savings associated with treating a DSM as a single entity include the decreased demand for personnel 
under nominal operating conditions, but an increased need for off-nominal operations resources, as demonstrated by 
NASA’s Space Technology 5 mission, which consisted of three 25 kilogram satellites.50 The mission encountered a 
series of anomalies when it was first deployed on orbit, including false signals from the sun sensors and 
inappropriate constellation configuration. In response to these challenges, the “ST5 Anomaly Team” was activated 
in an attempt to preserve mission performance.51 Despite the initial challenges and largely due to the efforts of the 
anomaly team, ST5 was able to achieve its objectives. Toward the end of the 100-day mission, ST5 also completed a 
weeklong ‘lights out’ operating period. During this operating phase, the constellation used a set of pre-programmed 
commands to function without ground station input.51 Previous work has argued that fully autonomous constellation 
orbit maintenance could simplify and reduce the cost of constellation operations.48 
The cost considerations for constellation operation are not limited to planned maneuvers or autonomous 
operating conditions. Extended constellation operating lifetimes will likely represent an additional program cost for 
future missions. Many recent Earth science missions have surpassed their planned mission durations, and NASA 
currently spends approximately 10% of its Earth science budget maintaining and processing data from spacecraft 
that have exceeded their operational lifetimes.52 Decommissioning multiple spacecraft simultaneously may also 
result in additional costs to mitigate risk and achieve NASA orbital degree requirements.  
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In light of these trends in DSM operations, we recommend that the current approach to DSM operations 
cost estimating be reconsidered, including the development of a new CER that addresses the degree of 
autonomy built into a given constellation operation plan. Many sources currently use software development costs 
as a driver for operating costs,17 and others base their estimates on mission class or number of instruments.33 These 
cost drivers may not fully capture the operating considerations presented above.  
 
4. Technology Development Costs  
Launched in 2006, ST5 was intended to introduce several new technologies and achieve an extensive set of 
technological objectives, including the deployment of three satellites working as a single system, miniaturized 
components, and an autonomous operating period.53 The mission met its intended objectives, but also experienced 
62.5% cost growth.54 A detailed explanation of the reasons behind this cost growth is not available, but subject 
matter experts have expressed concerns over the ability of programs to raise TRL on small satellite missions and 
simultaneously achieve aggressive science goals. This impact may be felt to a lesser extent by temporally distributed 
spacecraft missions, which can leverage the experience gained by prior missions to inform decisions about 
incorporating low-TRL technologies. We plan to address the cost growth associated with technology development 
missions in future work, and reserve our recommendations on the subject of technology development costs for that 
future work.  
V. Illustrative Example 
To emphasize the importance of these recommendations, we present a toy problem in the form of a brief, high-
level walk through of the DSM space vehicle cost estimating process for a homogenous, Earth observing 
constellation, using both the traditional method of costing a single satellite and multiplying it by n, and a novel 
approach that includes adjustments with respect to the first set of recommendations.  
Our costing reference mission consists of 12 identical spacecraft, each with a dry mass of 100 kg, carrying an 
Earth observing payload. Given the mass of the system, we will conduct our traditional, multiply-by-n cost 
assessment using CERs from the Small Satellite Cost Model, as published in Space Mission Analysis and Design, 3rd 
Ed. by Wertz and Larson.17 For the sake of generality, we will cost the satellite payload as a fraction spacecraft bus 
cost, rather than specifying a particular payload; we will not specify orbital parameters (which could impact the need 
for radiation hardening) and will not discuss the time value of money considerations that would come with 
developing a scalable architecture. For the sake of brevity, we will treat only the spacecraft bus and payload costs in 
this example, addressing our recommendation for the consideration of design iteration and the need for the 
incorporation of learning curve factors. Nonrecurring costs include those development costs incurred only once, 
such as ground support equipment development and some program level considerations. Recurring costs include 
those development costs that are necessarily incurred more than once, such as flight hardware, operations cost, and 
some other program level considerations.  
 Using the CERs available from the 1996 version of the Small Satellite Cost Model,** we can leverage the mass 
of the satellite as a cost driver and produce a cost estimate for the spacecraft bus using Eqs. (1) and (2).17 Here, 
Cspacecraft represents the cost of the spacecraft bus (FY00$K)††, Cpayload represents the cost of the satellite payload 
(FY00$K), and mdry is the satellite dry bus weight (kg). The results of these equations for our costing reference 
mission are presented in Table 2.  
 
Cspacecraft  =  781 + 26.1 mdry1.261 (1) 
 
Cpayload  =  0.4 Cspacecraft (2) 
 
Here, the nonrecurring costs are assumed to constitute 60% of the payload and spacecraft bus cost. By extension, 
the recurring costs assumed to constitute 40% of the payload and spacecraft cost.17 The constellation nonrecurring 
                                                            
** We have chosen to use the 1996 CERs, given their widespread use and public availability, as published in the 3rd 
Edition of Space Mission Analysis and Design. This choice is made in hopes that the reader is likely to have a copy 
of this text on hand, such that the application for specific software licenses (even if the software is publically 
available) is not needed. The 2014 release of the SSCM includes more up to date CERs and can be obtained online 
from The Aerospace Corporation.  
†† Fiscal Year 2000, thousands of dollars. The results provided in the table are in Fiscal Year 2000 dollars, for 
clarity. 
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cost values are identical to an equivalent monolithic mission’s costs because the design is formulated only once. The 
constellation recurring cost values are the result of the corresponding single satellite value by n, the number of 
satellites in the constellation, which here is equal to 12. While this is a simplistic representation, early stage cost 
estimates for constellations are often based on more complex estimates for the individual satellites, but then subject 
to the same basic multiplication process.20  
 
Table 2. Results of traditional, multiply-by-n constellation costing approach for costing reference mission. 
  Single Satellite 
Single 
Satellite 
Nonrecurring 
Single 
Satellite 
Recurring 
Constellation Constellation Nonrecurring 
Constellation 
Recurring 
Spacecraft 
Bus Cost 
(FY00$) 
$9,463,414.34  $5,678,048.60  $3,785,365.74  $51,102,437.44  $5,678,048.60  $45,424,388.84  
Payload 
Cost 
(FY00$) 
$3,785,365.74  $2,271,219.44  $1,514,146.29  $20,440,974.98  $2,271,219.44  $18,169,755.53  
Total Cost 
(FY00$) $13,248,780.08 $7,949,268.05 $5,299,512.03 $71,543,412.42 $7,949,268.05 $63,594,144.37 
 
Turning to our first set of recommendations, we can begin to refine the cost estimate to more accurately 
represent the emerging DSM paradigm. The costs for the individual satellite are again calculated using Eqs. (1) and 
(2). The constellation level calculations however, leverage the recommendations made by Nag et al. and those 
discussed in Section 5.1 above. We aim to capture the learning curve benefits and incorporate the first 
recommendations pertaining to design iteration through the use of design heritage factors.  
 To account for potential design iteration and the cost of designing the DSM as a system, rather than purely 
reproducing the same design n times, we have incorporated a standard factor that can be applied for development 
heritage, 0.2. This factor is appropriate for scaling back the RDT&E costs of designs that are essentially copies of an 
existing satellite.17 Given that each of the copy satellites (those produced after the first unit) are essentially copies of 
an existing satellite, and may have iterations associated with their development, we can calculate the cost of the 
copies using the development heritage factor. Therefore, the constellation RDT&E costs have been calculated by 
adding the RDT&E cost of the individual satellite to the product of the single satellite RDT&E costs, n – 1, and the 
scaling factor, 0.2. In short, for each copy satellite after the first satellite, the program incurs an additional 20% of 
the single satellite RDT&E costs.  
The constellation recurring costs, accounting for learning curve savings, can be calculated according to Eq. (3), 
where RCconstellation is the recurring cost of each of the satellites within the constellation, RCindividual is the recurring 
cost of the individual satellite, n is the number of satellites in the constellation, and b is the learning curve factor 
expressed as a decimal. The constellation spacecraft bus and payload recurring costs utilize the learning curve factor 
suggested for small satellites by Nag et al., in their 2014 work: 0.67.7 While this is substantially lower than the 
standard NASA prescribed learning curve factor of 0.85, it was found to be more reliable for small satellites by Nag 
et al.  
RCconstellation =  RCindividual nlog2b  (3) 
 
The results of this refined costing effort, and the difference between the traditional and refined methods, are 
presented in Table 3. While this is a simple example for the sake of demonstration, and should not be treated as a 
cost estimate for a mission similar to our costing reference mission, it demonstrates the trends in overall cost savings 
due to the learning curve effect and design iteration. Notably, the allowance for design iteration results in an 
increase in nonrecurring costs, as shown by the negative difference in constellation nonrecurring costs in Table 3. 
This upward trend is to be expected as design iteration necessarily incurs additional costs. By accounting for this 
iteration earlier in the cost estimating process, program managers could improve the fidelity of their initial estimate 
and prevent significant cost overruns. Similarly, the trends in the subsequent recommendations can be considered at 
early design stages to improve the likelihood that cost estimates fully account for the nuances of DSM cost 
estimating. For example, increased planning for the manufacturing process will incur additional design costs, but 
may reduce manufacturing costs through the planned elimination of costly fabrication procedures. Increased mission 
operations automation will increase software development costs and emphasize the need for anomaly management 
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teams, but decrease the need for personnel during nominal operations. Quantification of these cost trends will be an 
important step toward improving the state of DSM cost estimating and warrants further research. 
 
Table 3. Results of refined, constellation cost estimating approach for costing reference mission. 
  Single Satellite 
Single 
Satellite 
Nonrecurring 
Single 
Satellite 
Recurring 
Constellation Constellation Nonrecurring 
Constellation 
Recurring 
Spacecraft 
Bus Cost 
(FY00$) 
$9,463,414.34  $5,678,048.60  $3,785,365.74  $28,978,463.49  $18,169,755.53  $10,808,707.95  
Payload 
Cost 
(FY00$) 
$3,785,365.74  $2,271,219.44  $1,514,146.29  $11,591,385.40  $7,267,902.21  $4,323,483.18  
Total 
Revised 
Cost 
(FY00$) 
$13,248,780.08  $7,949,268.05  $5,299,512.03  $40,569,848.88  $25,437,657.75  $15,132,191.13  
Total 
Difference 
(FY00$)  
$0.00  $0.00  $0.00  $30,973,563.53  ($17,488,389.70) $48,461,953.24  
 
VI. Conclusion  
This paper constitutes an assessment of shortcomings within the existing parametric cost estimating toolkit, as it 
pertains to distributed spacecraft mission architectures, and builds upon the work presented by Nag et al. in their 
2014 work. By developing an aggregate approach to constellation cost estimating, we were able to compare existing 
perspectives and models for satellite cost estimation to the current trends in experimental DSM development. We 
identified three areas in particular where existing methodologies are ill suited to address the innovations of the 
emerging DSM paradigm, addressed the challenges of developing technology as part of a small satellite DSM 
architecture, and made the following recommendations for further development in realm DSM cost estimating.  
The existing ad-hoc constellation term should be supplemented by two subclassifications: purely ad hoc DSMs 
and temporally distributed spacecraft missions. This subclassification better captures the unique nature of follow on 
missions and programs that are designed to continuously contribute to a data record over the course of many 
decades. Design iteration, and by extension product rework, retesting, and refurbishment, should be specifically 
included within DSM and constellation work breakdown structures, and should be considered essential project 
deliverables by project management. These elements should be incorporated as part of Work Breakdown Structure 
Element 6. The manufacturing of DSM member satellites is increasingly being addressed as a parallel process, and 
current practices are challenging traditional assumptions regarding system integration and testing procedures. We 
have argued that spacecraft manufacturing be incorporated into Work Breakdown Structure Element 10. Existing 
parametric cost estimating relationships likely do not fully capture the extent of the changes to DSM satellite 
manufacturing and testing, and we believe that cost estimating models should be updated to reflect these integration 
and test practices. The possibility of building redundant architectures that allow for the loss of member satellites 
should be considered when costs are allocated to mitigate mission risk during both the design and test phases. In 
light of the unique cost and risk tradeoffs presented by DSM operating practices, we recommend that cost estimating 
relationships for DSM operations be re-evaluated for accuracy and that new cost estimating relationships and/or 
multiplicative factors be developed, as necessary. In future work, we will present the details and results of the 
aggregate cost model and its incorporation within TAT-C. We also plan to examine the appropriateness of existing 
design heritage factors for Earth science constellation and ad-hoc DSM architectures, and the cost of raising the 
technological readiness level of spacecraft component technologies as part of small satellite DSMs. 
Distributed spacecraft missions have the potential to offer new benefits to Earth scientists, but fully capturing 
those benefits will hinge on accurate cost estimating to support the mission proposal, development, and management 
processes. This survey constitutes an initial attempt at identifying and addressing the shortcomings of the existing 
cost estimating framework as it can be applied to DSMs. We have offered preliminary recommendations for 
improvements to these efforts and identified rich venues for future research in the realm of DSM cost estimation.  
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